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ABSTRACT
As Pennsylvania’s intermediate appellate court of general ju-
risdiction, the Pennsylvania Superior Court decides thousands of
cases each year.  The vast majority of those cases are disposed of
via unpublished memorandums.  These unpublished memorandums
are designated as non-precedential and may not be cited by parties
before the Superior Court.  As a result, litigants and their counsel
may not even persuasively cite an unpublished memorandum in
briefs or other papers submitted to the Court.  Thus, if counsel finds
an unpublished memorandum deciding the identical issue of the
case at hand and counsel is before the Superior Court judge who
authored that opinion, counsel is still unable to cite that unpub-
lished memorandum, even though counsel can freely cite sources
such as Mark Twain or Howard Stern.  However, the Common-
wealth Court, Pennsylvania’s other intermediate appellate court,
has recently amended its procedures to allow for persuasive citation
to its unpublished memorandums.  This development has led to re-
cent controversy and calls for change in the Superior Court’s
procedures.
This Comment will first examine the history of the debate over
unpublished judicial opinions and their precedential value on the
federal level.  This Comment will then explore the debate regarding
use of unpublished opinions in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Next, this Comment will analyze the various arguments in support
of the use of unpublished decisions and will examine these argu-
ments in the context of Pennsylvania’s court system.  Lastly, this
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Comment will recommend that the Superior Court adopt the ap-
proach recently taken by Pennsylvania’s other intermediate appel-
late court, the Commonwealth Court, and allow persuasive citation
to unpublished memorandums.  Such a change would not only ben-
efit litigants and counsel, but it would also aid the Superior Court
and enhance public confidence in the judiciary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
New lawyers admitted to the bar in Pennsylvania have learned
a lot.  First, they spent considerable time and money educating
themselves and earning an undergraduate degree.1  Next, they
doubled down with their time and money to obtain a law degree
from an “accredited law school.”2  Then, they devoted more time
and money to their legal education by studying for the Pennsylvania
bar examination.3  Not to mention, they also had to meet unspeci-
fied standards for character and fitness.4
When one peruses the bar examination subjects, one finds a
litany of the same subjects he or she learned in law school.5  How-
ever, one does not find, and therefore does not need to study, Penn-
sylvania appellate procedure.6  Consequently, a new lawyer would
most likely have no idea of Pennsylvania’s unique situation regard-
ing unpublished memorandums.7
In 2015, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania filed 4,946 opin-
ions.8  Only 274 of those opinions were filed as published.9  The
remaining opinions were filed as unpublished memorandums.10
Thus, roughly five percent of the Superior Court’s opinions were
published in 2015.11  Although this may not seem too important, the
significance becomes apparent when looking closer at the Superior
Court’s internal operating procedures.12  Since 1992, the Superior
Court has limited citation to only its published opinions.13  This
practice stands in contrast to the current practice in federal courts,14
and more relevant, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.15
This Comment will analyze the utility of the rules limiting cita-
tion to so-called “unpublished” judicial opinions, specifically as
1. PA. B.A.R. 203(a)(1) (2016).
2. PA. B.A.R. 203(a)(2)(ii).
3. PA. B.A.R. 203(b)(1).
4. PA. B.A.R. 203(b)(2).
5. See Bar Exam Tests and Subjects Tested, PA. BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS,
http://www.pabarexam.org/bar_exam_information/testsubjects.htm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2017).
6. See id.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. 2015 Caseload Statistics of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania, AD-
MIN. OFF. OF PA. CTS., http://media-downloads.pacourts.us/2015Reportcompres
sed.pdf?cb=4182111 (last visited Nov. 21, 2016).
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. See id. (274 out of 4,946 equals roughly .055 or 5.5 percent).
12. See PA. SUPER. CT. I.O.P. § 65.37 (2016).
13. Id.
14. See infra Part II.A.3.
15. See infra Part II.B.2.
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these rules apply to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.16  Part II
of this Comment will discuss the origin of the debate over unpub-
lished judicial opinions and the current situation on the federal
level,17 before focusing on the situation in Pennsylvania.18  Part III
will analyze the various arguments in support of limiting citation to
unpublished decisions19 and then examine the applicability (or in-
applicability) of these arguments to Pennsylvania’s judicial
system.20
Part III will also propose that the Superior Court adopt a new
procedure in accordance with its sister court, the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania.21  The new procedure would allow for per-
suasive citation to the Superior Court’s unpublished memoran-
dums.22  Finally, Part IV will briefly summarize the issues and
observations discussed throughout this Comment.23
II. BACKGROUND
A. Debate on the Federal Level
1. Limiting the Publication of Cases
In response to the proliferation of the number of cases being
adjudicated in federal courts in the early 1960s, the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States24 passed a resolution which directed fed-
eral courts to limit their publication of opinions to only those with
“precedential” value.25  By 1973, the Federal Judicial Center26 also
16. See infra Parts III.A–B.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. See infra Part III.C.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. The Judicial Conference of the United States serves as the policy-making
organization for all federal courts. See About the Judicial Conference, ADMIN.
OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/governance-
judicial-conference/about-judicial-conference (last visited Oct. 7, 2016).  The Con-
ference is required to meet at least once annually, and its members include the
Chief Justice of the United States (acting as presiding officer), the chief judge of
each federal circuit, the chief Judge of the Court of International Trade, and one
district judge from each federal circuit. Id.
25. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 11 (Mar. 16–17, 1964),
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts /JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceed
ings.aspx?doc= / uscourts / FederalCourts / judconf / proceedings/1964-03.pdf (“That
the judges of the courts of appeals and the district courts authorize the publication
of only those opinions which are of general precedential value and that opinions
authorized to be published be succinct.”).
2018] UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUMS, NO-CITATION RULES 745
advocated for federal appellate courts to limit their publication to
only certain cases which met the suggested “standard for publica-
tion.”27  Furthermore, the Judicial Center recommended that all
opinions not chosen for publication “shall not be cited as precedent
by any court or in any brief or other materials presented to any
court.”28
As a result, nearly every federal circuit adopted local rules that
followed the advice of the Judicial Center by restricting the publica-
tion of decisions and preventing citation to those opinions.29  From
around 1980 to 2000, not only did the caseload of federal appellate
courts grow at an alarmingly fast rate, but the number of cases dis-
posed of via unpublished opinions grew exponentially.30  However,
the dispute over unpublished opinions did not take center stage in
appellate practice circles until the Eighth Circuit declared that fed-
eral court rules designating unpublished opinions as non-preceden-
tial were unconstitutional.31
2. The Anastasoff-Massanari Saga
The debate over the constitutionality of unpublished opinions
designated as non-precedential arose in Anastasoff v. United
States32 through a fairly mundane issue regarding the appellant’s
overpayment of federal income taxes.33  The appellant claimed that
although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously heard
the exact issue appellant raised and found contrary to her claim, the
26. The Federal Judicial Center was established by Congress in 1967 at the
urging of the Federal Judicial Conference. See About the Federal Judicial Center,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2016).  It serves as
“the research and education agency of the federal judicial system.” Id.
27. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL
OPINIONS 22 (1973), http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/appel-
late/id/33 (introducing a model rule restricting publication to any opinion which
“establishes a new rule or law or alters or modifies an existing rule,” “involves a
legal issue of continuing public interest,” “criticizes existing law,” or “resolves an
apparent conflict of authority”).
28. Id. at 23.
29. See J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Legal Fiction of the “Unpublished” Kind:
The Surreal Paradox of No-Citation Rules and the Ethical Duty of Candor, 1 SE-
TON HALL CIR. REV. 27, 38–39 (2005) (describing this development during the
1970s).
30. See Andrew T. Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A
Recipe for Ethical Problems & Legal Malpractice?, 26 MISS. C.L. REV. 185, 192–93
(2007) (illustrating in “Table #1: The Dramatic Increase in Federal Court of Ap-
peals Unpublished Opinions”).
31. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as
moot on reh’g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
32. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
33. Id.
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court was not bound by that ruling because it was decided with an
unpublished opinion and, thus, lacked precedential value.34  In an
opinion authored by Judge Richard Arnold, the Eighth Circuit re-
jected the appellant’s assertion that the prior unpublished opinion
was non-binding and held that the circuit appellate rule35 that
branded unpublished opinions as non-precedential was
unconstitutional.36
In his opinion, Judge Arnold engaged in a discussion of the
doctrine of precedent and concluded that it has historically been an
integral component of the common law system and judicial auton-
omy.37  He cited the works and opinions of Sir William Black-
stone,38 Sir Edward Coke,39 Alexander Hamilton,40 James
Madison,41 and Joseph Story42 to bolster his averment that “the
doctrine of precedent limits the ‘judicial power’ delegated to the
courts in Article III.”43  This conclusion rests on the presumption
that the practice of labeling only certain opinions as precedential
amounts to judicial legislating because it permits judges to issue
opinions that have no binding effect on later decisions.44
Judge Arnold also addressed some of the arguments advanced
by those in favor of non-precedential opinions.45  He clarified that
the court was not commenting on the value of unpublished opinions
and their utility in appellate courts, but merely on the notion that
34. Id.
35. 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i) (2000) (providing at the time of the court’s opinion in
Anastasoff,  223 F.3d 898, that “[u]npublished opinions are not precedent and par-
ties generally should not cite them”).
36. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899 (“We hold that the portion of [8TH CIR. R.
28A(i)] that declares that unpublished opinions are not precedent is unconstitu-
tional under Article III, because it purports to confer on the federal courts a power
that goes beyond the ‘judicial.’”).
37. See id. at 900 (“In sum, the doctrine of precedent was not merely well-
established; it was the historic method of judicial decision-making, and well re-
garded as a bulwark of judicial independence in past struggles for liberty.”).
38. Id. at 900–01 (citing various volumes of SIR WILLIAM W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765)).
39. Id. at 901 (citing various volumes of SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1642)).
40. Id. at 902 (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
41. Id. (citing Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25,
1831), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 390, 390–93 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981);
Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnson (June 21, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 250 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977)).
42. Id. at 903–04 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 377–78 (1833)).
43. Id. at 903.
44. See id. at 904 (stating that this practice exceeds the judicial power).
45. See id.
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unpublished opinions have no precedential effect.46  He also illumi-
nated the fact that, although an opinion may be labeled as unpub-
lished, it is still available to litigants because all court opinions are
available online or at the clerk’s office.47  Judge Arnold’s colleague,
Judge Heaney, concurred with the opinion and specifically com-
mended Judge Arnold for his discussion of the precedential conse-
quence of unpublished opinions.48  However, not everyone agreed
with Judge Arnold’s declarations.49
A year after Anastasoff, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
issued an opinion in Hart v. Massanari50 which criticized Judge Ar-
nold’s reasoning and conclusions.51  In Massanari, counsel for the
appellant cited an unpublished opinion in his brief, and the court
ordered him to show cause as to why he violated the Ninth Circuit
rule prohibiting citation of unpublished “dispositions.”52  Counsel
responded that the circuit rule prohibiting citation to unpublished
dispositions may be unconstitutional based on the Eighth Circuit’s
discussion in Anastasoff.53  In an opinion by Judge Alex Kozinski,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote explicitly to confront
what it deemed “the mistaken impression” that the circuit rule was
unconstitutional and to “lay these speculations to rest.”54
Judge Kozinski disputed Judge Arnold’s constitutional analysis
and concluded that the term “judicial power,” as used in Article III
of the Constitution,55 does not in itself set limitations upon the judi-
ciary.56  In direct contrast to Judge Arnold’s historical examination,
Judge Kozinski averred that the Framers would have no issue with
46. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904 (“The question presented here is not whether
opinions ought to be published, but whether they ought to have precedential ef-
fect, whether published or not.”).
47. Id. (“So far as we are aware, every opinion and every order of any court in
this country, at least any appellate court, is available to the public.”).
48. See id. at 905 (Heaney, J., concurring).
49. It is crucial to note that because Judge Arnold’s opinion was subsequently
vacated as moot, it did not stand and holds no precedential value today.  Anas-
tasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (vacating Anastasoff, 223 F.3d
898 as moot because the appellant taxpayer subsequently received the reimburse-
ment for overpaid taxes which she originally sought).
50. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
51. See id. at 1180 (“Unlike the Anastasoff court, we are unable to find within
Article III of the Constitution a requirement that all case dispositions and orders
issued by appellate courts be binding authority.”).
52. Id. at 1158 (reciting 9TH CIR. R. 36-3 which states, “[u]npublished disposi-
tions and orders of this Court are not binding precedent . . .” and “. . . may not be
cited to or by the courts of this circuit . . . .”).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
56. Massanari, 266 F.3d at 1161.
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court rules designating opinions as unpublished and non-preceden-
tial.57  He specifically noted that English common law judges did
not necessarily consider earlier case dispositions to be binding au-
thority.58  Moreover, Judge Kozinski quoted Sir William Blackstone
for the proposition that judicial opinions are not law unless cor-
rectly decided,59 and he also noted that the current view of binding
precedent was a recent development.60
Judge Kozinski then proceeded to lay out specific reasons sup-
porting no-citation rules and non-precedential opinions.61 First, he
discussed how published opinions serve as binding authority and
lead to mandatory conclusions in those courts bound by that au-
thority.62  He also asserted that the concept of binding authority
“deprives the law of flexibility and adaptability,” and, as a result,
may give “undue weight” to some decisions.63  Furthermore, he ac-
knowledged a need and desire to uphold the integrity of circuit
boundaries and conjectured that Judge Arnold’s view, which recog-
nized every decision as precedential, may conflict with or destroy
those boundaries.64  Indeed, Judge Kozinski feared that too much
precedent may not only lead to confusion and conflict,65 but also
unnecessary expenditure of court resources.66  While Judge Kozin-
ski’s concerns are certainly not unfounded,67 their application to
the Pennsylvania judicial system68 requires a much different
analysis.
57. See id. at 1163.
58. Id. at 1165.
59. Id. (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70–71 (1765)).
60. See id. at 1168 (“As the concept of law changed and a more comprehen-
sive reporting system began to take hold, it became possible for judicial decisions
to serve as binding authority.”).
61. See id. at 1171–78.
62. Id. at 1171–72.
63. Id. at 1175.
64. See id. at 1175–76 (arguing that strict adherence to the doctrine of prece-
dent would lead to a situation where one circuit “would have no authority to disa-
gree” with a ruling of another circuit that is “directly on point”).
65. See id. at 1179.
66. See Massanari, 266 F.3d at 1176–78.
67. See, e.g., Anika C. Stucky, Comment, Building Law, Not Libraries: The
Value of Unpublished Opinions and Their Effects on Precedent, 59 OKLA. L. Rev.
403, 407 (2006) (declaring that “when used in accordance with proper publication
standards and citation rules, unpublished opinions play an indispensable role in
both the federal and state judicial systems by providing more efficiency in
overburdened systems without compromising the tradition of precedent that is
central to such systems.”).
68. The formal name for the Pennsylvania court system is “The Unified Judi-
cial System of Pennsylvania.” See PA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
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3. Federal Practice Today
The debate over citation to unpublished opinions culminated
on the federal level with the passage of Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1.69  The rule expressly allows for citation to unpub-
lished opinions issued after January 1, 2007 in federal courts.70
However, the rule does not address the precedential value of un-
published opinions.71  Consequently, federal courts typically con-
tinue issuing unpublished opinions as non-precedential, but still
consider them as persuasive authority.72
For example, in the Third Circuit, decisions are classified as
either precedential or non-precedential.73  The non-precedential
opinions represent the Third Circuit’s version of unpublished opin-
ions.74  These opinions are not binding authority and, by tradition,
the court will not cite to them.75  Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure 32.1 provides uniformity for all federal jurisdic-
tions by allowing counsel to persuasively cite unpublished or non-
precedential opinions.76  This uniformity is missing in Pennsylvania
state appellate courts.
B. Unpublished Opinions in Pennsylvania
1. History of the Doctrine of Precedent and Unpublished
Opinions
A critic of Judge Arnold’s opinion in Anastasoff, historian and
law professor R. Ben Brown, investigated the history of the doc-
trine of precedent in Pennsylvania.77  He found that, in 1807, the
Pennsylvania legislature gave the judiciary the power to determine
which English statutes were part of Pennsylvania’s common law.78
Brown also noted that in 1808, a federal judge ignored precedent
from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and conducted his own ex-
69. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., Walton v. Gomez (In re Estate of Booker), 745 F.3d 405, 425 n.27
(10th Cir. 2014) (citing 10TH CIR. R. 32.1 for the proposition that, “Unpublished
opinions are not precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive value.”).
73. 3RD CIR. I.O.P. 5.1.
74. See 3RD CIR. I.O.P. 5.3 (declaring that non-precedential opinions are not
posted on the court’s website).
75.  3RD CIR. I.O.P. 5.7.
76. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
77. R. Ben Brown, Judging in the Early Days of the Republic: A Critique of
Judge Richard Arnold’s Use of History in Anastasoff v. United States, 3 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 355, 365–70 (2001).
78. See id. at 365–66.
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amination of Pennsylvania common law principles.79  Therefore,
Brown claimed that early Pennsylvania legal history rebutted Judge
Arnold’s analysis, which emphasized that the doctrine of precedent
was firmly rooted in early America.80  Indeed, another critic of the
Anastasoff opinion built upon this history of the doctrine of prece-
dent to point out the vulnerability of Judge Arnold’s constitutional
separation of powers argument.81
This early muddling of the common law and precedent in
Pennsylvania made sense because the state transitioned from an
English colony and developed its own independent judiciary.82  As
Pennsylvania’s legal system developed in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, the population of the state grew rapidly.83  Not surprisingly,
Pennsylvania’s sole appellate court, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, experienced rising caseloads.84  In response to the Supreme
Court’s growing docket, the legislature established the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court in 1895.85  The Superior Court remained as
the state’s only intermediate appellate court until the Common-
wealth Court was established in 1968.86  While the Superior Court
handles the majority of appeals from Pennsylvania’s trial courts,
both civil and criminal, the Commonwealth Court “is primarily re-
sponsible for matters involving state and local governments and
regulatory agencies.”87
79. See id. at 366–67 (citing Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 425 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1833)).
80. Id. at 367.  Brown noted that:
Thus, the course of reception of the common law in Pennsylvania refutes
Judge Arnold’s narrow vision of American judges willingly following
prior precedents.  Instead, the story is a much more textured one of the
relationship between the legislature, the state judiciary, and even the fed-
eral judiciary in choosing which precedents should be followed and which
should be ignored.
Id.
81. See Stucky, supra note 67, at 428.
82. See History, THE UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://
www.pacourts.us/learn/history (last visited Oct. 9, 2016) (chronicling the develop-
ment of Pennsylvania’s judicial system).
83. In 1800, the population of Pennsylvania was 434,373. Population of the
United States and Counties of the United States: 1790-1990, U.S. DEPT. OF  COM.,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (Richard L. Forstall ed. 1996).  By 1850, the population
had grown to 2,311,786, and by 1900, the population was a staggering 6,302,115.
Id.  The current population of Pennsylvania is estimated to be over 12.8 million.
Pennsylvania Population 2016, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (Nov. 21, 2016, 6:56
PM), http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/pennsylvania-population/.
84. See History, supra note 82.
85. Id.
86. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 4 (1968) (establishing the Commonwealth Court).
87. Learn, THE UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://
www.pacourts.us/learn/history (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).  As provided by the Penn-
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In 1992, the Superior Court adopted Internal Operating Proce-
dure Section 65.37.88  This rule authorized the Superior Court to
dispose of cases via unpublished memorandums.89  Section 65.37
provides that “[t]he decision to publish is solely within the discre-
tion of the panel.”90  This rule leaves the judges of each particular
case with the ultimate discretion in whether or not to publish a
case.91  However, the rule also has a profound effect on litigants
and counsel because it generally prohibits the citation of decisions
which are designated as unpublished.92  While this prohibition lim-
its litigants and counsel to citing only published opinions of the Su-
perior Court, the rule does not restrict citation to cases from other
jurisdictions outside of Pennsylvania, whether those cases are pub-
lished or not.93
sylvania Judicial Code, the Commonwealth Court maintains exclusive jurisdiction
of appeals taken from final orders of the courts of common pleas (general trial
courts) in “Commonwealth civil cases” (civil cases in which the state is a party),
“[g]overnmental and Commonwealth regulatory criminal cases,” “[s]econdary re-
view of certain appeals from Commonwealth agencies,” “[l]ocal government civil
and criminal matters,” “[c]ertain private corporation matters,” eminent domain
cases, and immunity waiver matters.  42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 762 (2016).  The Com-
monwealth Court also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over appeals taken from fi-
nal orders of government agencies in various cases and over certain mandatory
arbitration awards involving state employees. Id. § 763.  Generally, the Common-
wealth Court also possesses original jurisdiction over civil suits brought against the
state and has exclusive original jurisdiction over election disputes. Id. §§ 761, 764.
While this may seem like a significant portion of Pennsylvania’s adjudication, the
Superior Court maintains exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all other appeals
taken from the courts of common pleas (except for those in which the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction), including the overwhelming
majority of criminal cases. See id. § 742.  Thus, the Commonwealth Court’s wor-
kload is primarily cases involving the state government, excluding most criminal
matters. See id. §§ 761–64.
88. PA. SUPER. CT. I.O.P. § 65.37 (2016).
89. See id.
90. Id. at § 65.37(B).
91. The majority of cases heard by the Superior Court are decided by panels
of three judges. Learn, supra note 87.
92. PA. SUPER. CT. I.O.P. § 65.37(A).  This portion of the rule states in full:
An unpublished memorandum decision shall not be relied upon or cited
by a Court or a party in any other action or proceeding, except that such
a memorandum decision may be relied upon or cited (1) when it is rele-
vant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral es-
toppel, and (2) when the memorandum is relevant to a criminal action or
proceeding because it recites issues raised and reasons for a decision af-
fecting the same defendant in a prior action or proceeding.  When an un-
published memorandum is relied upon pursuant to this rule, a copy of the
memorandum must be furnished to the other party to the Court.
Id.
93. See id.
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In contrast to the Superior Court’s approach, in 2013, the Com-
monwealth Court amended its Internal Operating Procedures to al-
low persuasive citations to its unpublished decisions.94  The
Commonwealth Court is now placed in a position similar to that of
federal courts.95  Despite this change in practice initiated by its sis-
ter court, the Superior Court has yet to make a similar change
which would allow for persuasive citation to its unpublished memo-
randums.  In fact, since the adoption of Internal Operating Proce-
dure Section 65.37 in 1992, the vast majority of cases before the
Superior Court have been disposed of via unpublished
memorandum.96
2. The Current Debate
In recent years, many scholars have called for reconsideration
of the Superior Court’s no-citation rule.97  Perhaps the most con-
vincing plea for review of the current policy comes directly from a
judge of the Superior Court.98  In a short persuasive article, Judge
Mary Jane Bowes advocates for the Superior Court to consider con-
forming with the federal judiciary by allowing persuasive citation to
the court’s unpublished decisions.99  In support of her position,
Judge Bowes argues that the Superior Court’s work product should
be publicized and not sent “to languish in file cabinets.”100  She also
argues that no downside to persuasive citation exists because the
Court remains free to disregard those citations,101 the provision of
“transparency in the decision-making process” of the court will im-
prove public confidence in the judicial system,102 and attorney’s
94. PA. COMMW. CT. I.O.P. § 69.414(a) (2016).  This portion of the rule states
in full:
(a) An unreported opinion of this court may be cited and relied upon
when it is relevant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata or
collateral estoppel.  Parties may also cite an unreported panel decision of
this court issued after January 15, 2008, for its persuasive value, but not as
binding precedent.
Id.
95. Compare id. with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (allowing citation to unpublished or
non-precedential federal decisions).
96. See, e.g., 2015 Caseload Statistics of the Unified Judicial System of Penn-
sylvania, ADMIN. OFF. OF PA. CTS., http://media-downloads.pacourts.us/2015Re-
portcompressed.pdf?cb=4182111 (last visited Nov. 21, 2016) (noting that out of the
4,946 opinions filed in 2015, 4,672 were unpublished).
97. See infra Part II.B.2.
98. Mary Jane Bowes & Megan Bode, Feature: Private Justice or Public
Right?, 30 PA. LAW. 48, 51 (2008).
99. See id. at 50.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
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fees would likely not increase if citation to unpublished decisions
were permitted.103  Thus, Judge Bowes concludes that permissive
citation to unpublished decisions would benefit all
Pennsylvanians.104
Some practitioners have also made advances for a change and
have come to the same conclusion as Judge Bowes.105  Others have
questioned the current Superior Court practice of disposing of so
many cases as unpublished memorandums because these cases
often involve important legal issues.106  Indeed, one practitioner has
observed that unpublished opinions tend to be just as carefully writ-
ten and well-reasoned as their published counterparts.107
Despite all of these calls for change, prominent appellate attor-
ney and Chair of the Pennsylvania Appellate Court Procedural
Rules Committee, Kevin McKeon, has cautioned that citing unpub-
lished opinions may have some unintended consequences, such as
confronting and overcoming adverse unpublished memoran-
dums.108  Moreover, the Superior Court has defended the constitu-
tionality of its no-citation rule109 and cited the reasoning of Judge
103. See id. at 51.
104. See id.  The article stated as follows:
Memorandum decisions constitute the vast bulk of the judicial output of
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.  This court, for most citizens, is the
court of last resort.  The methods and results of its decisions affect the
lives of every person in Pennsylvania.  Why not give attorneys every pos-
sible tool, including the thoughts and processes of most of the judicial
reasoning in Pennsylvania, as they seek zealously to represent their
clients?
Id.
105. See, e.g., Howard Bashman, Superior Court Should Lift Ban on Citing Its
Unpublished Opinions, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.the
legalintelligencer.com/id=1202764598900/Superior-Court-Should-Lift-Ban-on-Cit-
ing-Its-Unpublished-Opinions?slreturn=20160818133840.
106. See, e.g., Robert N. Feltoon, Pa. Superior Court Should Change Its Pub-
lishing Policy, LAW 360 (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/614853/pa-
superior-court-should-change-its-publishing-policy.
107. Wendy Rothstein, Pa Superior Court–Why so Many Unpublished Opin-
ions?, FOX ROTHSCHILD: PA. TRIAL PRACTICE BLOG (Oct. 1, 2013), http://patrial
practice.foxrothschild.com/pennsylvania-superior-court/pa-superior-court-why-so-
many-unpublished-opinions/.
108. See Kevin McKeon, Citing Unreported Opinions: Worth the Trouble?,
HAWKE MCKEON & SNISCAK: HMS LEGAL BLOg (Feb. 23, 2011), http://
www.hmslegal.com/easyblog/entry/citing-unreported-opinions-worth-the-
trouble.html.
109. See Schaaf v. Kaufman, 850 A.2d 655, 661 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).  The
court stated:
It is true that there is a substantial body of opinion that believes that
counsel should be able to refer to memorandum decisions, not as binding
precedent, but for their reasoning, as one would refer to an opinion from
another state or a federal court. Other options are available, but regard-
754 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:741
Kozinski in Massanari.110  In light of the current debate, a careful
analysis of both sides of the debate and how the various arguments
apply to Pennsylvania is needed.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Main Arguments Against Allowing Citation to Unpublished
Opinions
1. Unpublished Opinions and No-Citation Rules Allow Judges to
Efficiently Dispose of Cases Without Devoting Too Many
Judicial Resources
Not surprisingly, a chief proponent of the use of unpublished
opinions to conserve judicial resources is Judge Kozinski, the au-
thor of the opinion in Hart v. Massarini.111  In that case, Judge
Kozinski averred that crafting a precedential opinion “is an exact-
ing and extremely time-consuming task.”112  Thus, he opined that
appellate courts lack the time and resources to issue such carefully
constructed precedential opinions in every matter they are called
upon to decide.113  Judge Kozinski then went on to compare the
utility of unpublished opinions to the Supreme Court’s power of
discretionary review,114 concluding that deciding cases on an un-
published and non-precedential basis enables appellate courts to
decide a “manageable” number of cases that hold precedent.115  In
fact, his concern extended to a belief that allowing citation to un-
published opinions would result in more work for already
overburdened appellate judges because of an increase in unpub-
lished concurrences and dissents.116  He feared such a development
would lead to published opinions of noticeably lower quality.117
less of which is “best,” we believe our current practice passes constitu-
tional muster.
Id.
110. Id. at 660.
111. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2001).
112. Id. at 1177.
113. See id. (“It goes without saying that few, if any, appellate courts have the
resources to write precedential opinions in every case that comes before them.”).
114. The United States Supreme Court decides most cases on a discretionary
basis in which parties file a writ of certiorari seeking the Court’s review. See SUP.
CT. R. 10 (“Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion.  A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling
reasons.”).
115. Massanari, 266 F.3d at 1178.
116. See id.
117. See id. (“The quality of published opinions would sink as judges were
forced to devote less and less time to each opinion.”).
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Judge Kozinski reiterated this position when he appeared
before a congressional subcommittee to the Committee on the Judi-
ciary regarding the state of unpublished opinions in the federal judi-
cial system.118  Interestingly, Judge Kozinski asserted that the only
difference between published and unpublished opinions in the
Ninth Circuit was the no-citation rule pertaining to opinions of the
unpublished type.119  However, in the same prepared statement, he
also highlighted that unpublished opinions are completed in a rela-
tively short amount of time and with less scrutiny than a published
opinion.120
Nonetheless, appellate courts face daunting caseloads,121 but
scholars disagree as to whether the use of unpublished opinions in-
creases the efficiency of the judiciary.122
118. Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 28
(2002) [hereinafter Unpublished Judicial Opinions] (statement of Hon. Alexander
Kozinski) (“Quite simply, deciding some cases by unpublished disposition, which is
simply a letter to the parties telling them who won and who lost, and why, frees us
up to spend the time that needs to be spent on published opinions, the ones that
actually shape the law.”).
119. Id. at 30 (“Unpublished dispositions differ from published ones in only
one respect—albeit an important one: They may not be cited by or to the courts of
our circuit.”).
120. Id. at 32 (“While an unpublished disposition can often be prepared in
only a few hours, an opinion generally takes many days (often weeks, sometimes
months) of drafting, editing, polishing and revising.”).
121. See, e.g., Federal Court Management Statistics, June 2016, U.S. Court of
Appeals Summary, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statis-
tics-reports/federal-court-management-statistics-june-2016 (last visited Nov. 22,
2016) (providing that between July 1, 2015, and June 30, 2016, 11,531 appeals were
filed in the Ninth Circuit alone).
122. Compare Stucky, supra note 67, at 448 (“The use of unpublished opin-
ions curbs the strain on court resources while promoting the facilitation of a man-
ageable body of caselaw.”) with Kenneth F. Hunt, Note, Saving Time or Killing
Time: How The Use Of Unpublished Opinions Accelerates The Drain On Federal
Judicial Resources, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 315, 341 (2011).  Hunt concluded, in
part, as follows:
Certainly, the workload of the federal courts is an important considera-
tion, if not the most important, for the proliferation of rules governing
procedure in those courts.  The evidence of the increased workload of the
federal courts speaks for itself, and it is unnecessary to expound upon it
in any detail.  But if the premises of the argument made in this Note are
true, maintaining a system of unpublished opinions undermines the very
rationale that unpublished opinions are founded upon.  Saying that un-
published opinions decrease the workload of the federal appellate courts
does not magically make it so.
Id.
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2. Unpublished Opinions are Written for a Limited Audience;
Therefore, They Should Not Serve as Citable Authority
Again, Judge Kozinski stands in the forefront of the argument
that unpublished opinions are not intended to be citable author-
ity.123  He has declared that unpublished opinions serve an impor-
tant goal of resolving a legal dispute and appraising the parties of
why the court ruled the way it did.124  However, he cautioned that
unpublished opinions do not necessarily make good precedent, in
part because they are often written by clerks and staff attorneys.125
He also asserted that some cases are not “suitable for preparation
of a precedential opinion” primarily due to poor briefing by lawyers
and/or “poorly developed records.”126  Lastly, he suggested that be-
cause the Ninth Circuit generally decides cases via three-judge
panels, and published decisions are often reviewed by other judges
of the court, nonpublished opinions do not serve as pertinent au-
thority that represents the views of the court as a whole because
most judges never read them.127  Accordingly, Judge Kozinski con-
cluded with a warning that a rule allowing persuasive citation128
could lead to appellate courts providing parties with less pertinent
information out of fear that their words in the opinion may be mis-
used or misinterpreted.129
Judge Kozinski’s view of judges writing unpublished opinions
for a private audience of only the parties themselves has not gone
without criticism.130  In fact, one scholar has proclaimed that judges
who take the view endorsed by Judge Kozinski do not fully appreci-
123. See Hon. Alexander Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1, 51 FED. LAW. 36 (2004) [hereinafter Kozinski, In
Opposition].
124. See id. at 38 (declaring that the use of unpublished opinions allows
judges to “make sure that a disposition reaches the correct result and adequately
explains to the parties why they won or lost”).
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. See id. (stating that it is “possible to assert truthfully that our published
opinions do represent the view of the full court,” while on the other hand, “unpub-
lished dispositions are highly misleading as a source of authority.”).
128. Presently, the federal rule permitting citation to unpublished opinions is
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
129. Kozinski, In Opposition, supra note 123, at 42 (“The rule may, in fact,
have perverse effects, as courts of appeals judges, wary of having their words mis-
used, will tell the parties less and less in cases where they do not publish a prece-
dential opinion.”).
130. See generally Joan M. Shaughnessy, Unpublication and the Judicial Con-
cept of Audience, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1597 (2005) (examining Judge Kozin-
ski’s views and its criticisms).
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ate their audience.131  This averment is supported by firsthand solic-
itation of the opinions of lawyers132 and by the notion that judges
who sign their name to any opinion, published or unpublished,
should be responsible for what it says.133
3. Unpublished Opinions Hold No Precedential Value and Add
Nothing New to the State of the Law
Another one of Judge Kozinski’s arguments against citation to
unpublished opinions is that unpublished opinions inherently hold
no precedential value.134  In Massanari, he maintained that regard-
ing unpublished opinions as precedent would unnecessarily add to
the body of precedent because cases decided on a non-precedential
and unpublished basis tend to deal with well-established areas of
law.135  Thus, he claimed that increasing the body of precedent
would multiply “the number of inadvertent and unnecessary con-
flicts,” due to slight language differences in opinions that express
the same reasoning.136
To no surprise, Judge Kozinski would go on to repeat his con-
cerns,137 and others have also proclaimed that unpublished opinions
add nothing new to the legal importance of cases because they
merely apply well-settled law to the facts of a case.138  However,
some unpublished opinions do deal with new and/or important legal
issues.139  Indeed, when applying these various arguments against
citation to unpublished opinions to the current practice in Penn-
131. Id. at 1602 (proclaiming that “the judges who conceive of unpublished
dispositions as private letters misunderstand their audience”).
132. See id. (citing Stephen R. Barnett, The Dog that Did Not Bark: No-Cita-
tion Rules, Judicial Conference Rulemaking, and Federal Public Defenders, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1491, 1504 (2005) (finding “virtually no complaints” in al-
lowing citation to unpublished opinions)).
133. See id. at 1603.
134. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001).
135. See id. (“Cases decided by non-precedential disposition generally involve
facts that are materially indistinguishable from those of prior published
opinions.”).
136. Id.
137. See Kozinski, In Opposition, supra note 123, at 40 (citing J. Clark Kelso,
A Report on the California Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 492 (1994)
(asserting that the clear majority of unpublished opinions do not establish new law
nor involve new factual situations)).
138. See Memorandum from Hon. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory
Comm. on Appellate Rules to J. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules
of Practice & Procedure 57 (May 14, 2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/AP5-2004.pdf (relaying statement of Ninth Circuit
Judge Stephen S. Trott that unpublished opinions simply apply settled law).
139. See id.
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sylvania’s Superior Court, it becomes clear that many of the con-
cerns do not pass muster.
B. Application to Pennsylvania
This Part will present arguments specific to the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania in favor of citation to unpublished opinions.
In addition, it will directly address the arguments advanced against
citation, primarily those discussed in Part III.A.
1. Holding Judges Accountable
Perhaps the strongest argument to be made for allowing cita-
tion to the Superior Court’s unpublished memorandums is the im-
portant public interest in holding judges accountable for their
decisions.  In Pennsylvania, many public scandals have demon-
strated the need for increased judicial accountability.140  Alarm-
ingly,141 a few of these scandals involved Justices of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.142   Public opinion demands holding
140. See, e.g., Luzerne County Kids-for-Cash Scandal, JUVENILE LAW
CENTER, http://jlc.org/luzerne-county-kids-cash-scandal (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
The Juvenile Law Center explains the infamous kids-for-cash scandal as follows:
In 2007, a frantic call from an alarmed parent prompted Juvenile Law
Center to investigate irregularities in Pennsylvania’s Luzerne County ju-
venile court.  We discovered that hundreds of children routinely appeared
before Judge Mark Ciavarella without counsel, were quickly adjudicated
delinquent (found guilty) for minor offenses and immediately transferred
to out-of-home placements.  We petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in 2008 to vacate the juveniles’ adjudications of delinquency and
expunge their records.
Though the court denied our initial petition, once the United States
Attorney alleged that Ciavarella and another Luzerne County judge had
accepted nearly $2.6 million in alleged kickbacks from two private for-
profit juvenile facilities, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted our re-
quest for extraordinary relief.  The US Attorney also filed federal crimi-
nal charges against both judges.
Id. This scandal inspired both a book and a movie. See WILLIAM ECENBARGER,
KIDS FOR CASH: TWO JUDGES, THOUSANDS OF CHILDREN, AND A $2.8 MILLION
KICKBACK SCHEME (2012); KIDS FOR CASH (SenArt Films 2013).
141. See generally PA. COURT WATCH, http://www.pacourtwatch.com/ (last
visited Jan. 22, 2017) (providing news and resources regarding “Public Advocacy
for Judicial Accountability” in Pennsylvania).
142. See Brad Bumsted and Natasha Lindstrom, Pa. Supreme Court Justice
Eakin Retires Amid Criticism Over Lewd Emails, TRIB LIVE (Mar. 15, 2016), http://
triblive.com/news/adminpage/10149648-74/eakin-emails-attorney (“Suspended Su-
preme Court Justice Michael Eakin stepped down Tuesday after months of criti-
cism about racy and lewd emails he exchanged, his attorney said.”);  Adam
Brandolph, Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline Officially Removes Joan Orie
Melvin from Supreme Court Seat, TRIB LIVE (Aug. 18, 2015), http://triblive.com/
news/allegheny/8936462-74/court-melvin-office (“The Pennsylvania Court of Judi-
cial Discipline officially removed former Supreme Court Justice Joan Orie Melvin
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judges accountable for their actions, and judicial accountability is
vital to the public’s trust in the judicial system.143  Amid these re-
cent scandals, judicial accountability has become a paramount con-
cern of Pennsylvania citizens.144
Pennsylvania’s unique judicial system demands even more ac-
countability for its elected judges.  Under the current system, Penn-
sylvania judges are elected by their constituents.145  Most of the
judges, including those on the Superior Court, are elected to a term
of ten years.146  Following the completion of that ten-year term, the
judges are then eligible for a retention election.147  If a majority of
voters favor retention via a straightforward “yes” or “no” vote, the
judge is then appointed to another ten-year term.148  Recently,
Pennsylvania voters narrowly approved a constitutional amend-
ment changing the mandatory judicial retirement age from 70 to
75.149  Critics of the amendment have proclaimed that a mandatory
retirement age of 70 is a crucial check on the judiciary’s power and
that extension of the retirement age to 75 entrenches judges in posi-
tions of power without enough public oversight.150
from office more than two years after she resigned and became ineligible to hold
public office because of a campaign corruption scandal.”);  Karen Langley, Justice
McCaffery Steps Down from Pennsylvania Supreme Court, PITT. POST GAZETTE
(Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2014/10/27/Sources-Justice
-McCaffery-to-step-down-from-Pennsylvania-Supreme-Court/stories/20141027
0154 (“Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Seamus McCaffery, who was tempora-
rily suspended last week amid accusations of sending pornographic emails and at-
tempting to blackmail a fellow justice, resigned Monday . . . .”).
143. See Aharon Barak, Foreword, A Judge On Judging: The Role of a Su-
preme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 60–62 (2002).
144. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Court Watch Demands Transparency and Ac-
countability in the Courts, WILKES-BARRE/SCRANTON INDEP. GAZETTE (Apr. 28,
2015), http://wilkesbarrescrantonig.com/2015/04/28/pennsylvania-court-watch-de-
mands-transparency-and-accountability-in-the-courts.  Pennsylvania Court Watch
noted that:
We are demonstrating in response to decades of abuse and miscarriages
of justice that have been heaped on the people of this great state:  the
lack of due process and unequal treatment in criminal and civil courts,
rampant legal abuse in family courts in backroom deals, and other injus-
tices, all due to a lack of outside oversight.
Id.
145. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3131(a) (2016) (mandating that judges be
elected).
146. Id. § 3152(a).
147. Id. § 3153.
148. See id.
149. See 2016 Presidential Election, Tuesday, November 8, 2016 Official Re-
turns, PA. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.electionreturns.pa.gov/ENR_NEW (last
updated Jan. 22, 2017).
150. Editorial, Vote ‘No’ on Judges:  In Plain Language—Keep Their Retire-
ment Age at 70, PITT. GAZETTE (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.post-gazette.com/opin-
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While it has been argued that merit selection and retention
elections are beneficial in our democratic system of government,151
others, including a former Superior Court Judge, have argued that
popular elections are “the most democratic approach to choosing a
judiciary.”152  That contention may be true; however, it also rein-
forces the notion that judges must be held accountable to their
constituents.153
Because judges in Pennsylvania are elected, they are public
servants and should be held accountable to the people.154  Allowing
judges to spend less time analyzing legal issues and to dispose of
them via unpublished opinions because of a subjective belief that
they may not advance or clarify the law is a circumvention of the
judiciary’s role.155  Each case still involves citizens of the Common-
wealth to whom judges should be accountable.  Moreover, as ad-
vanced by Judge Arnold in Anastasoff, this circumvention of legal
issues through the use of unpublished opinions allows judges to
subjectively decide what cases are more important than others and
effectively act as legislators.156
ion/editorials/2016/10/28/Vote-No-on-judges-In-plain-language-keep-their-retire
ment-age-at-70/stories/201610310069.
151. See, e.g., Billy Corriher, Merit Selection and Retention Elections Keep
Judges Out of Politics, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND (Nov. 1, 2012),
https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/courts/reports/2012/11/01/43505/
merit-selection-and-retention-elections-keep-judges-out-of-politics/.
152. Hon. Peter Paul Olszewski, Sr., Who’s Judging Whom? Why Popular
Elections are Preferable to Merit Selection Systems, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 2
(2004).
153. See id. at 15.  Judge Olszewski notes that:
Popular elections preserve the right of each eligible citizen to vote for
those who will serve him or her by applying the laws that govern all citi-
zens.  The people’s right to elect those by whom they are to be judged is
the “very touch-stone in the foundation of the democratic process.”  The
judicial election system maintains these long-cherished principles by
holding the state judges responsible to the people of the state, providing
judicial accountability, neutrality, and independence.
Id.
154. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3131(a) (2016) (mandating that judges are
elected); Bowes, supra note 98, at 50–51.
155. See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904–05 (8th Cir. 2000),
vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
156. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904.  Judge Arnold explained:
At bottom, rules like our Rule 28A(i) assert that courts have the follow-
ing power:  to choose for themselves, from among all the cases they de-
cide, those that they will follow in the future, and those that they need
not.  Indeed, some forms of the non-publication rule even forbid citation.
Those courts are saying to the bar:  “We may have decided this question
the opposite way yesterday, but this does not bind us today, and, what’s
more, you cannot even tell us what we did yesterday.”  As we have tried
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Even Judge Kozinski has admitted that in his experience, un-
published opinions are lower quality than published opinions157—a
disturbing admission for the parties whose lives are deeply affected
by the outcome of an apparently sloppily-decided, non-precedential
case.  Allowing persuasive citation to all cases might even en-
courage judges to assiduously scrutinize and work on all opinions,
resulting in fairer and more thorough adjudications for all litigants.
In fact, despite the Superior Court’s enormous caseload, the
judges are still able to dispose of a vast amount of cases with thor-
ough legal reasoning and application of the law via unpublished
memorandums.158  Accordingly, all judges, especially those elected
to Pennsylvania’s Superior Court, must take responsibility for their
decisions and should not be able to hide behind those decisions by
delegating them to an “un-citable” status.159  The argument that un-
published opinions allow judges to efficiently dispose of cases with-
out devoting too many judicial resources160 undermines the
important public interest of holding judges accountable to their
constituents.
2. Creating Legal Authority
When the Supreme Court of the United States established its
power of judicial review, Chief Justice Marshall declared, “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”161  It follows that every judicial decision es-
pouses an interpretation of the law.162  Since the founding of the
to explain in this opinion, such a statement exceeds the judicial power,
which is based on reason, not fiat.
Id.
157. See Unpublished Judicial Opinions, supra note 118, at 32 (“While an un-
published disposition can often be prepared in only a few hours, an opinion gener-
ally takes many days (often weeks, sometimes months) of drafting, editing,
polishing and revising.”).
158. This author has analyzed many of the Superior Court’s unpublished
memorandums and has yet to discover what could be considered sub-par legal rea-
soning and application.  Additionally, this author has not found any sources claim-
ing or establishing that the judges of the Superior Court place less importance on
unpublished memorandums than they do on published opinions.
159. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3131(a) (mandating that judges are elected);
Bowes, supra note 98, at 50–51 (arguing that the Superior Court’s work product
should be publicized and that allowing persuasive citation to unpublished memo-
randums would enhance the public’s confidence in the Court).
160. See supra Part III.A.1.
161. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
162. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as
moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177–78) (“Inherent
in every judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general principle
or rule of law.”).
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United States, the leaders of the country have acknowledged that
the duty of an appellate court is to apprise the facts from the record
and articulate and apply the law accordingly.163  Under the doctrine
of precedent, which has always directed our common law system,
each judicial decision serves as authority that binds future cases of
the same nature.164
This established history of the American judicial process and
authority directly contradicts the assertion that unpublished opin-
ions hold no precedential value and add nothing new to the state of
the law.165  To the contrary, the claim that judges, like those sitting
on the Pennsylvania Superior Court, consider their previous unpub-
lished memorandums of no value is unrealistic.  To the contrary, it
is more likely that those judges rely upon and confer with their un-
published memorandums to ensure an accurate interpretation of
the law and to avoid attacks of inconsistency or judicial activism.
Furthermore, unpublished opinions do contribute to the state
of the law.166  On numerous occasions, the Superior Court has en-
countered cases of first impression, but nonetheless, disposed of
them with an unpublished memorandum.167  Such action by the Su-
perior Court disproves the contention that unpublished opinions af-
163. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
164. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 377–78 (1833).
165. See supra Part III.A.3.
166. See generally Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions
as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235 (2004) (arguing “that limited publication and,
especially, no-citation rules are fundamentally incompatible with a system based
on the rule of precedent” and noting that unpublished opinions do sometimes add
to the state of law).
167. The following is a brief compilation of unpublished Superior Court deci-
sions that address issues of first impression:  Immaculata Univ. v. Hess Corp., No.
1021 EDA 2014, 2014 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4855 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2014)
(deciding whether an energy corporation could be classified as a nontraditional
marketer or a marketing services consultant under 52 Pa. Code § 62.101); Com-
monwealth v. Kingston, No. 2016 MDA 2012, 2014 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2430,
(Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 2014) (deciding whether 18 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 906
prohibits multiple convictions based upon separate solicitations that are designed
to culminate in the commission of the same crime); Commonwealth v. Torres, No.
2877 EDA 2013, 2014 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4038, (Pa. Super. Ct. June 26,
2014) (deciding whether a trial court can consider a criminal defendant’s immigra-
tion status in imposing a sentence creates a substantial question of law); In re
E.P.L., No. 2207 EDA 2012, 2013 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 452 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Dec. 7, 2013) (Wecht, J., dissenting) (deciding whether 18 PA. CON. STAT.
§ 6111(g)(2) constitutes a separate, chargeable offense under Pennsylvania law);
Estate of Righter, No. 228 EDA 2012, 2013 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1184, (Pa.
Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2013) (deciding whether non-compliance with Rule 5.6 of the
Orphans Court Rules results in a shifting of the burden of proof as a sanction);
Commonwealth v. Nguyen, No. 1337 EDA 2012, 2013 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
4134, (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2013) (deciding whether the regulation subsection of
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fect only the parties involved and hold no legal importance or
precedential value.168  Additionally, issues of first impression dis-
posed of via unpublished memorandums controvert the assertion
that unpublished opinions should not be regarded as any type of
citable authority.169  A better assumption, based on legal reasoning
and common logic, is that unpublished memorandums resolving is-
sues of first impression will act as a starting point for future deci-
sions from the Superior Court or the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.
3. Availability of Cases
Since the end of 2012, all the Superior Court’s opinions, pub-
lished and unpublished, have been available on the Unified Judicial
System of Pennsylvania’s website.170  The unpublished memoranda
are also now available on both Lexis and Westlaw.171  Such wide-
spread availability of these cases brings many advantages and few
disadvantages.172  For starters, the publication of all the Superior
Court’s work product allows for easy access to the court’s legal rea-
soning and rulings.173  Consequently, litigants and their lawyers
have everything they need at their fingertips with no added cost.174
The availability of these cases also conflicts with the position that
unpublished decisions are fashioned for a limited audience.175
Even without citing the unpublished cases, a prudent lawyer would
be sure to analyze any unpublished decision that pertains to his cur-
204 PA. CODE § 201(a)(1) mandates that a defendant or his counsel notify the trial
court of his need for an interpreter).
168. See supra Parts III.A.2–3.
169. See supra Part III.A.2.
170. See Zack Needles, Superior Court Aims to Begin Putting Unpublished
Memorandum Opinions Online by Year’s End, PITT. POST GAZETTE (Oct. 8, 2012),
http://www.post-gazette.com/business/legal/2012/10/08/Superior-Court-aims-to-be
gin-putting-unpublished-memorandum-opinions-online-by-year-s-end/stories/2012
10080152.
171. This is based on the author’s personal usage and experience with these
services.
172. See, e.g., Bowes, supra note 98, at 50 (noting the benefits of publicizing
the Superior Court’s work product).
173. The opinions are available to the public for no cost through an internal
search engine at UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF PENNSYLVANIA, Superior Court,
Court Opinions, http://www.pacourts.us/courts/superior-court/court-opinions/De
fault.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
174. See Bowes, supra note 98, at 50 (“The scholarly work of the judiciary as
reflected in the unpublished decisions could assist later litigants, attorneys and
judges in resolving disputes.”).
175. See supra Part III.A.2.
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rent legal issue or objective.  This type of research would certainly
benefit clients and the legal community without an added cost.176
4. Ethical Duties of Lawyers
As professionals, lawyers are held to certain ethical stan-
dards.177  Lawyers have a duty to competently represent their cli-
ents.178  Rules of Professional Conduct specify that “[c]ompetent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”179
Lawyers also have a duty to “make reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”180  Further-
more, lawyers have a duty of candor towards the tribunal.181  In-
cluded within the duty of candor is the obligation to bring legal
authority adverse to a client’s position to the attention of the
court.182
These ethical duties ask a lot from lawyers.  Lawyers owe an
allegiance to not only their clients, but also to the court.183  Accord-
ingly, by allowing persuasive citation to unpublished memoran-
dums, lawyers can better serve their clients by citing cases that align
with the issues before them and alerting judges of the same.184
Overall, this could expedite litigation, clarify areas of law, and en-
sure that lawyers are providing competent representation.
By limiting citation to only those few cases that are published
by the Superior Court, a lawyer may find himself in an uncomforta-
ble situation.  If a lawyer discovers an unpublished case adverse to
his client’s position, should he disclose the case to the Court?  Like-
wise, if a lawyer finds an unpublished case that supports his client’s
176. See Bowes, supra note 98, at 51 (“Attorneys have always used discretion
in their research, following their best leads rather than pursuing every possible
avenue. Members of the bar are experienced in determining quickly whether a
decision is relevant, and they will not waste time on futile research efforts.”).
177. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N
1983).
178. Id. r. 1.1; PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (2013).
179. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1; PA. RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT r. 1.1.
180. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.2; PA. RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT r. 3.2.
181. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3; PA. RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT r. 3.3.
182. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(2); PA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(2).
183. See supra notes 177–182 and accompanying text.
184. See Bowes, supra note 98, at 50 (arguing that there is no downside to
allowing persuasive citation and noting that “judges must discern which case law is
helpful and which is irrelevant”).
2018] UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUMS, NO-CITATION RULES 765
position, must he ignore it when submitting arguments to the
Court?
The simple solution would be to allow the lawyer to persua-
sively cite the unpublished decisions.185  The lawyer would then be
spared from an ethical dilemma.186  Moreover, the judges of the Su-
perior Court would still be free to ignore the persuasive citation if
they find it prudent to do so.187
C. The Superior Court Should Adopt the Approach Taken by
the Commonwealth Court and Allow Persuasive Citation
to its Unpublished Memorandums
Based upon the preceding analysis of the primary arguments
against allowing citation to unpublished opinions as they apply to
the Pennsylvania Superior Court, this Comment now proposes that
the Superior Court adopt the approach taken by its sister court.
Allowing mere persuasive citation to the Superior Court’s unpub-
lished memorandums will result in numerous advantages for the
court, counsel, clients, and all Pennsylvania citizens.188
If the Superior Court were to adopt the approach that the
Commonwealth Court has taken, by continuing a practice of dispos-
ing of most cases via unpublished memorandums yet allowing coun-
sel to persuasively cite those decisions, the following should
185. See generally Bowes, supra note 98 (calling for allowance of persuasive
citation to the Superior Court’s unpublished memorandums and presenting sup-
porting arguments).
186. See Goering, supra note 29, at 47–56 (describing the “ethical dilemma”
facing lawyers when considering citations to unpublished opinions).
187. See Bowes, supra note 98, at 50.  Judge Bowes provided the following
instructive comments:
Persuasive citation means that judges would not necessarily be bound
by previous unpublished decisions.  If a memorandum is helpful, a judge
will certainly consider how the writing might be applicable to the case at
bar.  On the other hand, if an unpublished decision is not on point, a
judge can ignore the citation and rely instead on published law or more
specific unpublished memoranda.
Judges do not typically address every published case cited in a brief.
Under the current system, judges discern which case law is most helpful
and which is irrelevant.  If persuasive citation to memoranda were al-
lowed, judges would not suddenly lose their sense of prudence.  Similarly,
they would not discuss every citation.  Rather, Pennsylvania judges —
like those on the federal courts of appeals — could decide whether to
address or ignore the cited case.
When judges have the discretion to ignore, consider or follow the per-
suasive citation of a memorandum, any concern that the judicial wor-
kload might increase or that permissive citations would indirectly create
precedential law is unfounded.
Id.
188. See supra Part III.B.
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transpire:  1) Judges will be held more accountable to their constitu-
ents and will gain public confidence as a transparent judicial
body;189 2) The Superior Court’s caseload will be unaffected;190 3)
Lawyers will be better advocates for their clients and better officers
of the court;191 4) The state of the law in Pennsylvania will be
clearer and more defined for everyone;192 5) The Superior Court
will be in accord with not only the Commonwealth Court, but also
the federal judicial system, providing greater consistency for liti-
gants and lawyers alike.193
IV. CONCLUSION
For years, lawyers and judges alike have assessed the value of
unpublished opinions, particularly the unpublished opinions of ap-
pellate courts.  Prominent judges have even contemplated the con-
stitutionality of unpublished opinions.  But, in Pennsylvania, the
debate has turned into a question of practicality, focused on the
Superior Court’s no-citation rules for unpublished memorandums.
Many of the arguments advanced in support of the use of unpub-
lished opinions and corresponding no-citation rules simply do not
apply to the operational realities of the Superior Court.
Indeed, Pennsylvania lawyers and judges have recognized the
need for change in the Superior Court’s rule pertaining to citation
and unpublished memorandums.  The time has come for the Supe-
rior Court of Pennsylvania to amend its internal operating proce-
dures and expressly allow for persuasive citation to its unpublished
memorandums.  In so doing, the Court will not only make life eas-
ier for litigants and lawyers, but it will also hold itself accountable
to the citizens of Pennsylvania.  Moreover, the Court would finally
put itself in accord with the approach taken by federal courts and
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania which will increase uni-
formity and transparency throughout the judicial system.
189. See supra Part III.B.1.
190. See supra notes 8, 122 (noting the Superior Court’s caseload for 2015 and
comparing arguments pertaining to the relationship between unpublished opinions
and a court’s workload).
191. See supra Parts III.B.2–4.
192. See id.
193. See supra Parts II.A.3, II.B.2, III.C.
